HE MYSTERY OF the Incarnation tells us that, in the course of human history, the Word of God assumed our nature without ceasing to be who and what he has been from all eternity, the only begotten Son of God, the second person of the Holy Trinity. Thomas Aquinas was far from alone in insisting that our understanding of how this took place be properly grounded in our understanding of why it took place. The Son of God assumed our nature so that he might suffer and die on our behalf, that we might be saved from the curse of sin and death and restored to God's friendship and the path towards our highest good: the beatific vision of God. Since only one who is human is in a position to suffer and die on our behalf, and since no mere human is in a position to offer such a condign sacrifice-one that satisfies the demands of God's justice with regard to the whole of our race-it has long been an article of faith that the Incarnation involves one person who is both fully human and fully divine. understanding the Incarnation in a way that avoids the heresies of Monophysitism and Nestorianism. 2 The former heresy fails to uphold the perduring reality of both natures, since it depicts them as blended into a single, theandric nature, according to which Christ is neither "perfect man" nor "perfect God." The latter upholds the reality of these natures at the expense of Christ's personal unity, since on this view the incarnate Christ involves two, numerically distinct persons, one of whom is human (Jesus of Nazareth) and one of whom is divine (the Eternal Word).
Following Peter Lombard, Aquinas's positive treatment of the Incarnation arises out of a debate between three accounts of this mystery which endeavor to avoid these theological hazards, accounts which have come to be known as the assumptus-homo theory, the subsistence theory, and the habitus theory.
3 While all three accounts profess allegiance to the one-person/two-natures formula of the Incarnation, they differ markedly as to how these natures are related to one another and to the one person of Christ. As its name suggests, the assumptus-homo theory maintains that the Son of God assumed our nature by assuming a complete human being. Having thus united himself to this human being, the one person of Christ exists in relation to two beings or substances, namely, his original, divine substance (whom he has been from eternity), and an assumed, human substance (whom he has become).
The subsistence theory categorically rejects this dualism of substances. On this account, the Son of God did not become an instance of our nature by assuming an instance of our nature. Rather, he became an instance of our nature by assuming those features which are essential to our nature, namely, a human body animated by a human soul. While the realization of such a soul/body union generally constitutes an individual substance (a discrete human being), this one does not, since this soul/body union has been united to the person of the Word from the first moment of its conception. On this account, the features that are essential to our humanity are owned by the person of the Word, so there is only one substantial being here rather than two. This being now subsists (i.e., exists in a substantial manner) both in his (original) divine nature and in his (assumed) human nature.
The habitus theory likewise rejects the dualistic commitments of the assumptus-homo theory. With the subsistence theory, this account maintains that the Eternal Word has taken on those features which are essential to our humanity, namely, a human body and soul. The habitus theory parts ways with the subsistence theory in two crucial respects. The first difference pertains to how the Word is thought to have assumed these features. On this account, the Word has adopted these features in a contingent and accidental manner: he wears them after the manner of a cloak (habitus). While these features might be thought of as a created extension of himself, they cannot in any sense be identified with him, since-strictly speaking-they do not literally become his features. Thus to touch the hand of his assumed body would not be to touch him, but rather to touch a body that is intimately (though accidentally) related to him. The second difference pertains to how his assumed body and soul are related to one another. On the plausible assumption that every soul/body union constitutes a distinct human being (and hence a discrete substance), this account maintains that the Word assumed these features separately: they are accidentally united to him without being united to one another. On this account, the Son of God takes on both realities after the manner of a garment, and he wears them, as it were, as separates.
Although Aquinas categorically rejects both the assumptushomo theory and the habitus theory, it is not hard to see why he is comparatively dismissive of the latter: on this account the Son of God does not literally become a human being, he merely appears to us in human vesture. We do not come to possess, as parts, the articles of clothing which we don; nor do we become personally modified by their properties. In addition, on this account the Son of God would lack a feature that is essential to our humanity, namely, that of possessing a human body which is animated by a human soul. Indeed, on this account the assumed body would not even be a human body, since a body is human only if it is properly informed by a human soul. 4 In this article I shall thus focus my attention on the first two positions outlined above. Part I presents Aquinas's account of the assumptus-homo theory; part II presents his primary reasons for rejecting this position; and part III presents his account of the subsistence theory, particularly as it arises out of this rejection. In part IV I take issue with Aquinas's case against the assumptus-homo theory. I argue, first, that this theory is implicitly grounded in a relativized conception of identity (according to which it is possible for an object a and an object b to be the same F but different Gs), and that Aquinas is in no position to reject this theory on these grounds since his account of the Holy Trinity is likewise informed by a relativized conception of identity. I subsequently argue that the assumptus-homo theory is immune from Aquinas's objections once it is properly informed by its implicit logic of relative identity. Finally, I argue that this approach provides us with a simpler and more intuitive means of understanding this mystery, and also with a more complete and effective strategy for responding to the charge that it is logically impossible. I thus conclude that if this account of the Incarnation is ultimately compatible with established Church doctrine, there are good reasons for preferring it to the one which Aquinas defends.
I. AQUINAS'S ACCOUNT OF THE ASSUMPTUS-HOMO THEORY
The subsistence theory and the assumptus-homo theory share three fundamental commitments. Both accounts maintain (i) that the one person of Christ is both fully human and fully divine; (ii) that one is human only if one is endowed with a human body which is properly informed by a human soul; and hence (iii) that the Son of God assumed our nature by uniting himself to a specific soul/body union. These accounts disagree most fundamentally about the ontological status of this union, with the central issue being whether it constitutes a complete human being.
Although brief references to the assumptus-homo theory are scattered throughout Aquinas's discussion of the Incarnation in the Summa theologiae, there are relatively few extended discussions of this position. 5 In the most protracted of these discussions, Aquinas describes "the first opinion set down by the Master" as one of three accounts of the Incarnation which endeavor to understand this mystery in a manner that avoids the heresies of Monophysitism and Nestorianism. 6 Speaking of this account, in particular, Aquinas writes:
Some conceded one person in Christ, but maintained two hypostases, or two supposita, saying that a man, composed of body and soul, was from the beginning of his conception assumed by the Word of God.
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On the assumption that every soul/body union constitutes a complete human being, this account maintains that the Word became human by assuming a human being from the first moment of its conception. In Aquinas's terminology, this human being would constitute a second hypostasis or suppositum. From the surrounding discussions it is clear that Aquinas is using these terms more or less interchangeably to denote a discrete, substantial reality. Hypostasis is the Greek equivalent of substance, and it is here being used to denote what Aristotle would have referred to as a primary substance, namely, a being of which things are said and which is not said of anything else in turn. Along the same lines, a suppositum is a complete, individual 5 In STh III, see q. 2, aa. 3 and 6; q. 4, a. 3; and q. 16, aa. 1 and 2. 6 STh III, q. 2, a. 6. The second account is the subsistence theory, and the third is the habitus theory. In this passage Aquinas goes on to observe that none of these accounts is properly styled as an opinion, since the second is required as a matter of faith while the others are implicitly heretical. 7 Ibid.
substance which is endowed with a specific nature. Aquinas thus writes that a suppositum of a given nature "is the individual subsisting in this nature." 8 In other words, a suppositum is the persisting, substantial reality which owns or exemplifies its nature. He goes on to observe that in some cases there is no room for a real distinction between a suppositum and its nature. In particular, he writes that if there is a thing in which there is nothing outside the species of its nature (as in God), the suppositum and the nature are not really distinct in it, but only in our way of thinking, inasmuch as it is called a nature as it is an essence, and a suppositum as it is subsisting.
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For Aquinas, the divine reality is both a nature and a suppositum; when we characterize this reality as a suppositum, however, our emphasis is on it as a complete, substantial being.
In the first extended discussion of this position in the Summa theologiae, Aquinas takes up the question of "whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the suppositum or hypostasis."
10 Since the assumptus-homo theory takes the Incarnation to involve the union of two supposita, Aquinas presents this theory as rejecting his account of the hypostatic union, one which maintains that the union of natures "took place in the supposetum or hypostasis."
11 His logic here is unexceptionable. One who takes the union of natures to involve a plurality of supposita must deny that this union exists in the one suppositum which Aquinas takes to be present, namely, the suppositum which he has just identified as the person of the Word. 12 In the course of discussing objections to his account of the hypostatic union, Aquinas cites passages from Augustine, Pope Leo, and Boethius, passages that challenge his account by appearing to affirm the presence of a second suppositum in Christ. The passages from Augustine and Leo both occur in the first objection, which runs as follows: The first clause attributed to Augustine (from Enchiridion 38) explicitly mentions a duality of substances existing in Christ, with the added claim that the divine and human substances "are one Son of God." The second clause (from Enchiridion 35) supports this position in a manner which is echoed by the passage from the Tome of St. Leo. Here Aquinas is drawing attention to the use in these texts of the relative pronoun other (alius). In particular, he is noting that the use of the neuter (impersonal) form of this pronoun (aliud) appears to affirm a second being or substance, in distinction from the masculine (and hence personal) form (alius), which would indicate the existence of a second person. 15 While these passages do not provide us with sufficient grounds for concluding that Augustine is indeed committed to this account of the Incarnation (especially since the passages which Lombard cites in support of the other two accounts are also drawn largely from Augustine), we can at least say that he provides us with many passages that are friendly to this position. This fact was not lost upon Aquinas, who for obvious reasons was keen to disassociate Augustine from this position. Thus, for example, in response to Augustine's contention (in De agone christiano 11) that "the Son of God assumed a man, and in him bore things human," 16 Aquinas insists that passages like these "are not to be taken too literally, but are to be loyally explained, whenever they are used by holy doctors; so as to say that a man was assumed inasmuch as his nature was assumed." 17 We may now turn to the passage from Boethius which appears to affirm a second, human substance in Christ. As before, Aquinas presents the following passage in the course of discussing objections to his "one substance" account of the hypostatic union:
Further, hypostasis is nothing more than a particular substance, as Boëthius says (De Duab. Nat.). But it is plain that in Christ there is another particular substance beyond the hypostasis of the Word, viz. the body and the soul and the resultant of these. Therefore there is another hypostasis in Him besides the hypostasis of the Word.
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This passage begins with the truistic observation that an hypostasis is a particular substance. The sequel is anything but truistic: it affirms a second substance existing in relation to the Word, namely, the human being which is constituted by his assumed body and soul. It is worth noting that the part of this objection which is explicitly attributed to Boethius stems from his definition of a person as an "individual substance of a rational nature" in Contra Eutychen et Nestorium (parenthetically cited under the title De persona et duabus naturis).
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Since Aquinas's refutation of the assumptus-homo theory leans heavily upon this definition, it might seem odd that he is attributing this account to Boethius. The existence of a second substance does not follow from Boethius's definition of person, much less from the truistic observation that an hypostasis is a particular substance. Even so, this attribution is fully justified, since in Contra Eutychen VII Boethius contends that the assumptus-homo theory is required as a matter of Catholic doctrine. In particular, he argues that the two-substance account of the Incarnation is the "middle way" between the heresies of Nestorius and Eutyches, and hence that it is the only way of affirming that in Christ "there are two natures but one person as the Catholic Faith believes."
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Aquinas is not merely content to show that an assumptushomo theorist must reject his account of the hypostatic union. He also forcefully objects to this theory's alternate conception of this union, one which involves the union of two substances (one divine and one human) in the one person of Christ. In the Summa theologiae, Aquinas observes that advocates of Lombard's first opinion maintain both (i) "that there is but one person in Christ," and (ii) "that there is one hypostasis of God and another of man, and hence that the union took place in the person and not in the hypostasis." 21 In other words, this account maintains that the divine and human substances are united in and to the one person of Christ. A more detailed account of this position may be found in parallel passages in the Compendium theologiae and the Summa contra gentiles. In the former, having just catalogued the heretical implications of the habitus theory, Aquinas writes:
And others, wishing to avoid the aforementioned inappropriate things, held that the soul in Christ was united to the body, and that such a union constituted a human being that they say that the Son of God assumed into the unity of his person. And by reason of this assumption, they say that the human being is the Son of God, and that the Son of God is the human being. And because they say that the aforementioned assumption had the unity of the person as its terminus, they profess one person of God and the human being in Christ.
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In this passage Aquinas provides us with a substantially richer and clearer account of the assumptus-homo theory. This account begins with the thesis (i) that the Son of God assumed a properly animated human body (i.e., one united to a human soul). On the implicit grounds (ii) that every soul/body union constitutes a complete human being, this account further maintains (iii) that the Son of God assumed a human being by uniting this human being to himself. Since it is granted by all (iv) that the Son of God is himself a complete substantial reality, this account is committed to the thesis (v) that the Incarnation involves a plurality of substances (one human and one divine). 23 This, in turn, raises the question of how these substances are related to one another. How, in other words, is the Son of God related to the son of Mary? According to Aquinas, this account maintains that because the Son of God united the son of Mary 22 Comp. Theol. I, c. 210 (Regan, trans., 159). 23 Although he takes the assumptus-homo theorist to affirm the existence of a second substance in Christ, and hence to suppose that there are two substances here rather than one (one human and one divine), Aquinas takes it for granted that "substance" would not apply to both realities in the same sense. Rather, as in all other cases in which common nouns are applied both to God and to creatures, Aquinas takes the assumptushomo theorist to maintain (i) that "substance" applies to the assumed human being in something like its ordinary sense, and (ii) that "substance" is being extended to God by way of analogy. Although this human being would not be a suppositum in Aquinas's sense, it is easy to see why one might take it to be fully substantial, since it is capable of independent existence, and (unlike a soul) it has a complete specific nature.
to himself, we can now affirm (vi) that the Son of God is the son of Mary. Since the 'is' here is the 'is' of identity, and identity is symmetrical relation, we can indeed say (vii) that the Son of God is the son of Mary and that the son of Mary is the Son of God. Finally, because this human being was assumed "into the unity of his person," we can insist (viii) that one and the same person is both the Son of God and the son of Mary. This proposition, in turn, is sufficient for the thesis that the one person of Christ is both fully human and fully divine. It is thus not hard to see why Aquinas takes this account seriously: although it is implicitly heretical, the assumptus-homo theory offers a serious and at least initially plausible expression of the Chalcedonian formula.
The assumptus-homo theory's claim to Chalcedonian orthodoxy depends crucially upon propositions which I shall henceforth refer to as the unity thesis (iii), the plurality thesis (v), the identity thesis (vii), and the one-person thesis (viii). The plurality thesis affirms the presence of a second suppositum existing in relation to the Son of God, namely, the human being which is composed of Christ's body and soul. The unity thesis affirms that the Son of God united this human being to himself. The identity thesis makes the highly paradoxical claim that as a result of this union, this human being is the Son of God and the Son of God is this human being. And the one-person thesis affirms that this human being and the Son of God are one person rather than two.
How are we to understand the identity thesis, especially since it is affirmed in conjunction with the plurality thesis? And how is the identity thesis related to the one-person thesis? A preliminary answer to both of these questions may be found in a parallel passage in the Summa contra gentiles. Having presented versions of the unity and plurality theses, Aquinas goes on to affirm a more nuanced form of the identity thesis:
On account of this unity, the Word of God, as they say, is predicated of that man and that man is the Word of God. This sense results: "The Word of God is man" and that is: "The person of the Word of God is the person of the man," and conversely. 24 This account maintains that the divine and human substances come together in the person of Christ in such a manner that he is both the one and the other. Indeed on this account we can even say that the one is the other, since we can specify a sense in which the divine substance (here identified as the Word of God) and this human being are one and the same. Since "the person of the Word" is also "the person of the man," we can say that the Word and this man are the same person. 25 This, in turn, clarifies the relationship between the identity thesis and the oneperson thesis: if these substances are the same person, then there is one person here rather than two.
II. AQUINAS'S OBJECTIONS TO THE ASSUMPTUS-HOMO THEORY
While the assumptus-homo theory and the subsistence theory both maintain that Christ became human by assuming a human body and soul, the former theory contends, on the assumption that every soul/body union is a complete human being, that this union is itself a complete human being, and hence that there exists a second substance in relation to the one person of Christ. At least at first glance, this might appear to be a fairly trivial point. What harm is there in supposing this soul/body union to be a complete human being? For Aquinas, the harm would be incalculable, since this seemingly innocuous supposition has deeply heretical implications. As we shall see in what follows, he contends, first, that this account is committed to the Nestorian heresy of affirming a separate person for each of the two natures in Christ; second, that it is incompatible with the communication of idioms, which prevents us from attributing human features to the divine Son of God and divine features to the human son of Mary; and third, that it is committed to the Adoptionist heresy, since the assumed human being would perforce be a second, adopted Son of God.
A) First Objection
Most fundamentally, Aquinas contends that by affirming a second (human) substance in Christ, the assumptus-homo theorist is logically committed to the Nestorian heresy, since we cannot affirm the existence a second substance in Christ without tacitly affirming the existence of a second person in Christ. Thus, for example, in the Compendium theologiae Aquinas writes:
But this position, although it seems nominally to retreat from the error of Nestorius, slips into the same error with him if one should scrutinize it more deeply. For a person is clearly nothing but an individual substance of a rational nature, and human nature is a rational nature. And so, because this position posits in Christ a hypostasis or temporal and created existing subject of a rational nature, it also posits a temporal and created person in Christ. For this is what the terms existing subject or hypostasis mean, namely, individual substance. Therefore, when they posit in Christ two existing subjects or hypostases, if they understand what they say, they necessarily have to posit two persons. 26 This objection rests squarely on Boethius's conception of a person as an individual substance of a rational nature. 27 Although there are substances that are not persons (e.g., this cat or that tree), every substance endowed with a capacity for knowledge and volition is a person. In short, every rational being is a personal being, namely, a primary substance which is also a person. Since human beings are rational beings by nature, every human being is a person, every human being is a someone rather than a something. And if every human being is a person, we cannot affirm the existence of a second, human substance in Christ without affirming the existence of a second person in Christ. It thus follows that the assumptus-homo theory does not avoid the errors of Nestorianism and hence that an advocate of this position cannot consistently affirm both (i) that there is one person of Christ and (ii) that Christ assumed our nature by assuming a complete human being. It is worth adding that in support of this contention, Aquinas appeals to the following passage from the Second Council at Constantinople (553):
If anyone seeks to introduce into the mystery of the Incarnation two subsistences or two persons, let him be anathema. For by the incarnation of one of the Holy Trinity, God the Word, the Holy Trinity received no augment of person or subsistence.
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Not only does Aquinas take the council Fathers to be condemning any account of this mystery that represents Christ as assuming a second (human) substance, in his introduction of this passage he explains why they reject this position: this account commits one to saying that someone other than the Word "was born of a Virgin, suffered, was crucified, was buried." 29 An advocate of the assumptus-homo theory will surely endeavor to avoid this implication of a second person in Christ, and he might do this, Aquinas suggests, by insisting upon a real distinction between (a) this human being and (b) the person of this human being. This, in turn, will make it possible for one to affirm that the person of the human being is the person of the Word of God. Here is Aquinas's response to this line of reasoning:
Again, even if the hypostasis of that man could not be called a person, the hypostasis of the Word of God is nonetheless the same as His Person. If, therefore, the hypostasis of the Word of God is not that of the man, neither will the Person of the Word of God be the person of the man. This will falsify their own assertion that the person of that man is the Person of the Word of God. Even if we are able to drive a wedge between this human being and the person of this human being, we cannot do the same for the Word and the person of the Word, since they are identical. And since the divine substance (the Word) and this supposed human being are clearly not identical (they could hardly be less alike), neither can we say that the person of the Word is the person of this human being, since this would commit one to saying (since identity is a transitive relation) that this created and contingently existing person is the divine substance, which is clearly absurd.
B) Second Objection
Aquinas also contends that the assumptus-homo theory is incompatible with the communicatio idiomatum: it prevents us from attributing properties of the son of Mary to the Son of God and conversely. In the Compendium theologiae the following objection comes immediately after the first objection quoted above:
Second, any things that differ as existing subjects are so disposed that things proper to one cannot belong to the other. Therefore, if the Son of God and the human son are not the same existing subject, then it will follow that things belonging to the human son cannot be attributed to the Son of God, and vice versa. Therefore, we will be unable to say that God was crucified or born of the Virgin, and this belongs to the Nestorian impiety. 31 Since the Councils of Ephesus (432) Nestorians: they cannot consistently affirm that Mary is the mother of God. Since they insist upon a real distinction between the Son of God and the assumed human being, and since only the latter was born of the Blessed Virgin, they cannot say that Mary is the mother of God; they can only affirm the more modest claim that she is the mother of the (assumed) human being. In other words, advocates of this position must share in the Nestorian impiety of denying that Mary is the theotokos (God-bearer), and of insisting that she is merely the Christotokos (Christ-bearer).
It is worth noting that Aquinas takes this objection to be similarly confirmed by the holy fathers. In this instance he appeals to the following passage from Council of Ephesus (431):
If anyone ascribes to two persons or subsistences such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the saints, or by Himself of Himself, and, moreover, applies some of them to the man, takes as distinct from the Word of God, and some of them (as if they could be used of God alone) only to the Word of God the Father, let him be anathema.
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Since the council Fathers evidently condemn any account of this mystery which takes the Incarnation to involve two substantial realities rather than one, Aquinas can hardly be faulted for taking the assumptus-homo theory to fall under this condemnation. Nor is it hard to discern their grounds for this contention: any such revisionist account of this mystery would prevent us from speaking about Christ in a manner that is faithful to Scripture and tradition.
Once again, Aquinas is aware that assumptus-homo theorists will endeavor to avoid these heretical implications. Because they take the divine and human beings at issue here to be united in the one person of Christ, they will insist that they can affirm Aquinas's propositional examples of the communicatio idiomatum. In the Summa contra gentiles, for example, Aquinas anticipates the following response to this objection:
In this account whatever is predicated of the Word of God is, they say, able to be predicated of that man; and, conversely, although with a kind of reduplication, so that, when it is said "God has suffered," the sense is "A man who is God by unity of person has suffered," and "A man created the stars" means "He who is man."
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Since assumptus-homo theorists maintain that the Word of God and this human being are the same person, they will insist that they can speak of each being as having characteristics that are proper to the other. As Aquinas points out, this strategy is based on a logical device known as reduplication, that is, the practice of adding qualifying phrases to statements of predication, phrases that specify the respect in which a given quality is predicated of the subject. By means of this logical device, advocates of this theory endeavor to affirm such statements as the above. Thus, for example, they are wont to say (of Christ) that this man created the stars because they believe that he who is this man is the very one who (as God) created the stars. They likewise affirm that God was crucified because they believe that he who is God is the very one who (as man) was crucified. And so they can affirm that Mary is the mother of God because she is the mother of one (as man) who also happens to be God.
Since Aquinas himself defends the reduplicative strategy as a means of resolving paradoxical statements about Christ (e.g., that he is both equal to the Father and less than the Father), 35 he does not take issue with the viability of this strategy per se. He simply does not think that assumptus-homo theorists are in a position to employ this strategy. In the Compendium theologiae he writes that one may wish to say that we attribute things belonging to the human being to the Son of God, and the converse, because of the unity of the person, although the human being and the Son of God are different existing subjects. But this is altogether impossible. For it is clear that the eternal existing subject of the Son of God is nothing but his very person. The assumptus-homo theorist's use of this strategy is predicated on the thesis that the divine and human substances are one and the same person. Only then can one say, for example, that he who (as man) was born of Mary is the very one who (as God) created the stars. For reasons which we have already considered, Aquinas contends that assumptus-homo theorists cannot consistently affirm the presence of one person in Christ. In the above passage, for example, he argues that since the Son of God is identical with the person of the Son of God, this human being is the same person as the Son of God only if this human being is the Son of God, and this is clearly impossible. In the Summa contra gentiles, Aquinas undermines this use of the reduplicative strategy by appealing to Boethius's concept of 'person'. Since human beings are rational substances and all rational substances are persons, the human being that is alleged to exist in Christ would necessarily constitute a second, created person. 37 This, in turn, precludes assumptus-homo theorists from employing the reduplicative strategy.
C) Third Objection
In the Compendium theologiae, Aquinas presents a third and final objection to the assumptus-homo theory, namely, that this theory is committed to a Nestorian version of the adoptionist heresy. Here is the whole of this objection:
Third, if we should predicate the name God of a temporal existing subject, this will be fresh and new. But everything that we freshly and newly call God is only God because it has become God, and what has become God is God by adoption, and not by nature. Therefore, it will follow that the human being was God only by adoption, not truly and by nature, and this also belongs to the error of Nestorius.
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The assumptus-homo theory maintains that the Word of God assumed our nature by assuming a complete human being. If one who is God became human by assuming a human being, then there exists a human being who has become God. What has become God cannot be God by nature: it can only be God by adoption, that is, by a free act of the divine will. And so it appears that this human being is merely an adopted Son of God. This is problematic, I take it, because it implies that there are two Sons of God rather than one: there is one who is the Son of God by nature and one who is the Son of God by adoption. On this account, then, we cannot say (with Aquinas) that there is one person who underwent two births (one eternal, one temporal). 39 Nor can we say that there is one substantial reality who is both (a) eternally begotten of the Father and (b) born of the Virgin Mary. In support of this contention, Aquinas again appeals to the Council of Ephesus, which approved the following passage from "Felix, pope and martyr":
We believe in God our Jesus, born of the Virgin Mary: that He is God's everlasting Son and Word, and not a man assumed by God so that there is another [alter] besides him. Nor did God's Son assume a man that there be another [alter] beside Him; but the perfect existing God was made at the same time perfect man, made flesh of the Virgin. 40 Since the assumptus-homo theory insists upon a real distinction between the divine Son of God and the human son of Mary, advocates of this theory cannot consistently affirm that one and the same being is both perfect God and perfect man. Nor can they say that the Son of God himself literally became a man. For if the Son of God had assumed a man, this man would necessarily constitute another person (alter) existing alongside the Son of God.
D) Conclusion
In the most general terms, Aquinas takes the assumptushomo theory to be fundamentally confused. Since every human being is an individual substance of a rational nature, the Son of God could not have assumed a human being without assuming a second person. Had the proponents of this theory properly reflected on what it means to be a person, they would never have been tempted to say that the Son of God assumed our nature by assuming a human being. 41 This theory is also deeply heretical. Since it leads directly to the Nestorian heresy, it stands condemned by the proliferation of authoritative confessions and councils which were forcefully directed against this heresy. Moreover, many of these condemnations appear to be more-or-less explicitly directed against the assumptus-homo theory itself or any account of this mystery that affirms a plurality of substances in Christ. And so it would seem that the assumptus-homo theory is not a tenable option for one who endeavors to keep the Catholic faith "whole and entire." In what remains of this article, I will take issue with this contention. In part III I outline Aquinas's preferred account of this mystery, and in part IV I argue, first, that his objections against the assumptus-homo theory are unsuccessful, and second, that there are credible reasons for preferring this theory to the one Aquinas defends.
III. AQUINAS AND THE SUBSISTENCE THEORY
There is a clear sense in which Aquinas's positive account of the Incarnation arises out of his denial of the assumptus-homo theory. 42 Although he agrees that the Word assumed our nature by assuming a human body which is properly informed by a human soul, this union of soul and body cannot be a human being. For if it were a human being, then it would be a second substance existing in Christ, and since human beings are rational by nature, and all rational substances are persons, if this soul/body union were a human being then it would constitute a second person in Christ. But if-as Aquinas agrees-every other soul/body union constitutes a human being, why doesn't this one? And if it isn't a human being, then what is it?
Aquinas repeatedly insists that the Son of God did not become human by assuming our nature in the Platonic sense: he did not unite to himself the abstract essence of our humanity. Rather, he assumed our nature in atomo, that is, in a concrete individual. 43 In particular, he assumed our nature by assuming a human body which is animated by a human soul. Although he denies that this individual is a human being, he is bound to concede that it is very like a human being. This ensouled body is not merely a countable reality in the same way that a hand or a foot is, since unlike a hand or a foot (or a soul), it has a complete specific nature. This helps to explain why Aquinas refers to Christ's human nature as a "particular substance," 44 and as "a kind of individual in the genus of substance." 45 Indeed he even goes so far as to concede that this ensouled body is an individual in the genus substance, which is endowed with a rational nature, and not without reason, since it is endowed with a created intellect and will. So why isn't it a person? His answer:
We must bear in mind that not every individual in the genus of substance, even in rational nature is a person, but that alone which exists by itself, and not that which exists in some more perfect thing. Hence the hand of Socrates, although it is a kind of individual, is not a person, because it does not exist by itself, but in something more perfect, viz. in the whole. And hence, too, this is signified by a person being defined as an individual substance, for the hand is not a complete substance, but part of a substance. Therefore, although this human nature is a kind of individual in the genus substance, it has not its own personality, because it does not exist separately, but in something more perfect, viz. in the Person of the Word. 46 Even if every other union of body and soul is a person, this one is not because it exists in a substantial reality of a higher metaphysical order, namely, the person of the Word. Since something is a person only if it is a complete subsisting reality (a suppositum), because this union of soul and body is not complete subsisting reality, it is not a person. This body and soul do not constitute a complete subsisting reality because "in Christ they are united together, so as to be united to something higher, which subsists in the nature composed of them." 47 Although Aquinas concedes that the individual which is constituted by this soul/body union would be a suppositum if it were to exist separately from the Word, 48 in its current and actual mode of existence, it is not a complete subsisting reality because the Son of God is a complete subsisting reality and this ensouled body exists in him. And because this ensouled body is not a suppositum, it is not a man (human being) for the same reason that it is not a person: properly speaking, "man," "human being," and "person" alike refer to individual supposita. In these terms, then, it is logically impossible that the Son should have assumed a suppositum. And since something is a man only if it is a suppositum, it is likewise impossible that he should have assumed a man. Aquinas thus writes that "since we cannot say that a suppositum was assumed, we cannot say that a man was assumed." 49 He subsequently observes that "the Son of God is not the man whom he assumed, but the man whose nature he assumed."
50 By assuming our nature in atomo, the Son of God has himself become an instance of our nature. So Aquinas insists that he is "called a man univocally with other men, as being of the same species." 51 To fully appreciate Aquinas's position as an alternative to the assumptus-homo theory, we ought to say a bit more about how the Son of God is related to his two natures. To begin with, how is he related to his assumed, human nature? Aquinas contends that this union of body and soul was "assumed to the Divine Person or hypostasis." 52 In particular, the Word assumed this union of body and soul by uniting it to himself. He thus writes that "what is composed of them is united to the already 47 STh III, q. 2, a. 5, ad 1. 48 If a reason is sought, it is not wonderful; if an example is demanded, it is not unique. We must grant that something is possible for God, which we confess that we cannot investigate; for in such things the entire reason for the thing made is the power of the maker.
Since the scope of God's power vastly outstrips the breadth of our understanding, it is no idle obscurantism that prompts Augustine and Aquinas to suppose that the Word has united this body and soul to himself in a manner that we cannot begin to fathom.
Although we are not in a position to understand the positive nature of this union, Aquinas does think that we can specify some of its consequences. In the Compendium theologiae, for example, he observes that as a result of this union, "the soul and body are drawn into the person of the divine person, so that the person of the Son of God is also the person, hypostasis, and existing subject of the human son." 57 In other words, as a result of this union, we are presented with one person-one individual substance of a rational nature-who now subsists in two natures.
Although the Son of God is now said to have two natures and to subsist in two natures, he is not related to these natures 53 in the same manner, since he is identical with his divine nature, but not with his human nature. Aquinas thus writes that "the Son of God is his Godhead, but not his manhood." 58 On this account, then, the Son of God subsists in his human nature without being this nature. Although this doesn't tell us as much as we might want to know, it still tells us a good deal. It tells us that he exists in a substantial manner which now includes this nature, which is to say that the characteristics that accrue to this ensouled body also accrue to him. This tells us, in turn, that his relationship to this nature is not strongly analogous to one's relation to a garment or an instrument, 59 since this ensouled body is quite literally a physical extension of his existence: to touch Jesus' hand is to touch the Son of God. At the same time, we should note that though these bodily parts are now his, and more generally, that by having this nature he has all of its parts, Aquinas does not think that Christ is the mereological sum of this ensouled body and his divine nature. In this case he would not be fully human and fully divine, but merely part human and part divine. 60 Even so, Aquinas is willing to concede that there is a sense in which Christ is partly composed of his human nature. In particular, he thinks that the one person of Christ (who in himself is "altogether simple") is now composite because he now subsists in two natures. 61 In other words, the incarnate Christ is a composite being because he is no longer an absolutely simple being, since he is now endowed with a nature and with characteristically human parts and properties which are distinct from one another and from himself.
It is not hard to see why Aquinas embraces the subsistence theory: of the three accounts outlined by Lombard that claim to avoid the hazards of Monophysitism and Nestorianism, this is evidently the only one that enables us to uphold Christ's 58 STh III, q. 3, a. 7, ad 3. See also De unione, a. 2, ad 2. 59 Aquinas does concede that Christ's human nature is like a garment or an instrument in some respects. He affirms the first analogy at STh III, q. 3, a. 7, ad 3; he affirms the second at STh III, q. 2, a. 6, ad 4. humanity and divinity in a manner that does not undermine his personal unity. 62 In the following section I hope to show that this is not the case.
IV. A MODEST DEFENSE OF THE ASSUMPTUS-HOMO THEORY
Although Aquinas has presented a formidable case against the assumptus-homo theory, I contend that all three of the above objections miss the mark. In particular, I contend that this theory is implicitly grounded in a relativized conception of identity, and that once it is cast in these terms it is immune from these objections. I argue, in addition, that Aquinas is in no position to object to the assumptus-homo theory on these grounds, because his account of the Holy Trinity is likewise committed to a relativized conception of identity. Finally, though I am convinced that Aquinas's account of the Incarnation remains a tenable understanding of this mystery, 62 It should be emphasized that this is Aquinas's official, mature position with regard to the assumptus-homo theory. Apart from an isolated (and quite late) affirmation of a secondary esse in Christ in De unione, a. 4 (1272), Aquinas remained both firmly committed to the subsistence theory and resolutely opposed to the habitus theory. In some of his early writings, however, he is significantly less critical of the assumptushomo theory. Thus, for example, in the Sentences commentary (1252-56), he concedes that an advocate of this position can consistently affirm that Christ is one person existing in relation to two supposita (the divine suppositum and the assumed human being which is constituted by union of his assumed body and soul). In particular, he suggests that an advocate of this position can maintain that the assumed suppositum does not constitute a second someone, since it is "joined to another thing of a higher dignity" (III Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 1). That is, by invoking a strategy that is integral to his own position, Aquinas suggests that one might consistently maintain that "Christ is someone, namely the one assuming, and something, namely, the thing assumed; and that he is two in the neuter, but not in the masculine," and hence (in ibid., ad 1) that Christus est aliud et aliud, that he is both one Christ and two substances. Along the same lines, in Quodlibet IX (1256-59), though he insists that the habitus theory is implicitly heretical, Aquinas refrains from making the same claim with regard the assumptus-homo theory. Instead, he recommends the subsistence theory on the grounds that it is "the common opinion of recent writers and is truer and safer than the others [i. there are at least two reasons for preferring the assumptushomo theory, which I will outline.
Although the relation of identity is generally taken to be a two-way relation that holds, absolutely and without qualification, between an object and an object, for several decades a minority of philosophers have been articulating and defending a conception of this relation which is neither dyadic nor absolute. This account maintains, first, that identity is best conceived as a triadic relation which holds between an object and an object relative to a sortal count noun. On this relativized conception of identity, we cannot meaningfully say that (or ask whether) an object a is an object b: we must say that a is the same F as b, where 'F' is the sortal count noun which specifies the third, conceptual aspect of this relation. In addition to insisting that well-formed statements of identity include this conceptual element, this account also maintains that it is possible for an object and an object to be identical on some specifications but not on others. In other words, on this account of identity it is possible for a and b to be the same F but different Gs.
Before we proceed I would like to draw attention to three formal aspects of this relation. First, as we should expect from an equivalence relation, relative identity is both symmetrical and transitive in the following manner: If a is the same F as b, then b is the same F as a. And if a is the same F as b, and b is the same F as c, then a is the same F as c. Finally, it should be noted that this relation does not obey Leibniz's Law. If a and b are the same F but different Gs, this difference will inevitably mean that one of these Gs will have at least one property which the other lacks. While there is no shortage of philosophers who reject relative identity on just these grounds, 63 the formal consistency of first-order logic with relative identity has been demonstrated on multiple occasions. 64 Just as there are consistent geometries that do not include Euclid's parallel-line postulate, there are consistent first-order logics that do not include Leibniz's principle of indiscernibility.
Although the formal logic of relative identity has only recently been worked out in detail, it is not unusual for philosophers to find nascent instances of this logic embedded in theories and doctrines that long predate these developments. Indeed the most common application of relative identity pertains to the Latin formulation of the Holy Trinity, and not without reason, since this doctrine states that there are three persons of the Holy Trinity and that each of these persons, by himself, is identical with the divine reality. 65 This doctrine thus affirms that the Father and the Son are numerically distinct in one sense (they are distinct persons) and numerically identical in another (they are the same being), and this can only be true on a relativized conception of identity.
Since Aquinas is himself a defender of Latin Trinitarianism, it is worth asking whether his account of the Holy Trinity is likewise committed to a relativized conception of identity. I contend that it is. Although God is an absolutely simple being, the divine nature exhibits three subsistent relations, namely, the relations of paternity, filiation, and procession. These relations "distinguish and constitute" three hypostases, where each hypostasis is an eternally persisting, quasi-substantial reality. I say "quasi-substantial" for while each of these hypostases is an individual subject of properties and relations, they are not paradigmatic Aristotelian substances. Since these hypostases exist in one another and also in the divine essence, they do not exist as separate individuals in the ordinary sense. Even so, Aquinas does not hesitate to speak of them as substances and even as first substances. 66 It should thus not be surprising that he refers to each of the subsistent relations as a suppositum, with the implication that each is a complete substantial reality which falls under the genus substance and which exemplifies a specific nature. 67 Finally, since they are supposita of a (supremely) rational nature, Aquinas concludes that each of these subsistent relations is a distinct person.
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If the Holy Trinity involves three persons, and each is a complete substantial reality, and each of these persons is fully divine, how is there not a plurality of divine beings? Since he is committed to the doctrine of divine simplicity, Aquinas cannot say that each of these persons constitutes a part of the divine reality. Rather, on the principle that "that which subsists in the divine nature is the divine nature itself," 69 he contends that each of these persons is the whole of this reality, and hence that each of these persons is identical with the divine essence. 70 He consequently rejects the principle that "whatever things are identical with the same thing are identical with each other," 71 and insists that there is one sense in which these subsistent relations are identical (they are same divine essence, which is itself the divine reality) and another sense in which they are distinct (they are distinct relations subsisting in this reality). Thus, for example, speaking of the subsistent relations which are the Father and the Son, he writes that "although paternity, just as filiation, is really the same as the divine essence; nevertheless, these two in their own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects. Hence they are distinguished from one another." 72 Aquinas's account of the Holy Trinity depends upon a relativized conception of identity, that is, one that rejects the principle of indiscernibility and that holds between an individual (the Father) and an individual (the Son) in one sense (they are the same being) but does not hold in another (they are distinct persons).
For quite similar reasons, I maintain that the assumptushomo theory-the account which Aquinas presents and subsequently rejects as heretical-is likewise grounded in a relativized conception of identity. To see why, let us briefly return to two of the theses which he attributes to this account, namely, the plurality thesis, which affirms that the Son of God and the son of Mary are numerically distinct substances, and the identity thesis, which affirms (in its most complete and nuanced form) that the Son of God is the same person as the son of Mary. In a manner that strongly mirrors his official account of the Holy Trinity, Aquinas's account of the assumptus-homo theory presents us with one sense in which the Son of God and the son of Mary are identical (they are the same person) and with another sense in which are not identical (they are distinct beings or substances). Although it would clearly be premature to insist upon the truth of this account, we can at least say that it could only be true on a relativized conception of identity, for then and only then could one say that the Son of God and the son of Mary are the same person but different substances. From 71 STh I, q. 28, a. 3, ad 1. 72 Ibid. the vantage point of an absolute conception of identity, one who thinks that a is identical with b might well insist upon specifying the primary sense in which a is identical with b (e.g., that a is the same F as b), but one could not consistently go on to affirm a sense in which a is not identical with b (e.g., that a is not the same G as b). Since "a is the same F as b" would on this account be reducible to "a is an F, and b is an F, and a is identical with b," while "a is not the same G as b" would be reducible to "a is a G, and b is a G, and a is not identical with b," the statement "a and b are the same F but different G's" would have the contradictory implication that a both is and is not identical with b.
While there are many philosophers who would reject any theory or doctrine which is committed to a relativized conception if identity, Aquinas is in no such position, since his account of the Holy Trinity is informed by just such a relativized conception of identity. I do not contend that Aquinas was aware of this implication. On the contrary, I suspect that he was not and, indeed, that he did not have a clear sense of these competing accounts of identity. I say this, in part, because his objections to the assumptus-homo theory, as powerful as they are, have no bearing upon an account of this theory that is informed by a relativized conception of identity, as may be seen in a reconsideration of his objections.
In what is surely his most basic and fundamental objection, Aquinas contends that one cannot say that the Son of God became human by assuming a human being without implicitly affirming the existence of a second person in Christ. Since a human being is an individual substance of a rational nature, and since every such substance is a person, the second substance attributed to Christ would necessarily constitute a second person in Christ. Aquinas further takes this to indicate that advocates of this theory are simply confused about what it means to be a person. But is it plausible to suppose that Boethius is thus confused about his own concept of personhood? Once the assumptus-homo theory is properly informed by a relativized conception of identity, there is no basis for such a charge. With this account of identity in place, one can grant that the assumed human being is a person without having to affirm the existence of a second person in Christ, since one can say that this human being is the same person as the Son of God. If these beings are the same person, then there is one person here rather than two.
In addition, it is now plain that Aquinas's appeal to the transitivity of identity does not present a problem for the assumptus-homo theory. An advocate of this account would indeed affirm both (i) that the son of Mary is the same person as the Word and (ii) that the Word is the divine essence. While (i) is an instance of personal identity, (ii) is an instance of ontic identity: in affirming (ii) one is affirming that the Word is the same being as the divine essence. Since (i) and (ii) involve different sortal concepts, one who affirms the conjunction of (i) and (ii) is not committed to the (absurd) thesis that the son of Mary is the same being as the divine essence, much less to the thesis that the son of Mary is absolutely identical with the divine essence.
Next to be considered is Aquinas's contention that assumptus-homo theorists cannot consistently affirm such propositions as "Mary is the mother of God" or "a man created the stars." They cannot affirm these propositions, Aquinas maintains, because their affirmation of two substances in Christ precludes them from affirming the communication of idioms. In particular, they cannot affirm such statements by means of the reduplicative strategy, since the success of this strategy is contingent upon there being exactly one person who has both natures. It should now be clear, however, that assumptus-homo theorists are in a position to say just this, namely, that there is one person who is both fully divine and fully human. On this account, Christ is fully divine because he is personally identical with the divine substance, and he is fully human because he is personally identical with the assumed human being. This account maintains that Christ has always been personally identical with the first being, and by uniting himself to an ensouled human body he has become personally identical with the human being which is constituted by this union. Moreover, if he is personally identical with both of these substances, then their properties would accrue to him and vice versa. On this view one can affirm that Mary is the mother of God, since she is the mother of one (as a human being) who also happens to be God (since he who is the human being is also the Son of God).
Aquinas's third objection is that the assumptus-homo theorist is committed to the Adoptionist heresy. Since this account maintains that Christ is personally identical with the son of Mary and also with the eternally begotten Son of God, an advocate of this account can maintain, with Aquinas, that the one person of Christ has "two generations and two births." It may also be recalled that this objection rests upon the premise that if God has become a human being, then some human being has become God. It should now be clear that advocates of this theory will not concede, without qualification, that some human being has become God. Rather, they will insist that there is one sense in which this is true and another sense in which it is false. That is, they will affirm that a human being has indeed become personally identical with God, but they will deny that a human being has become ontically identical with God. It is clear, moreover, that Aquinas's objection only works if the assumptus-homo theory includes this latter claim, for only then would one be logically compelled to say that there are two Sons of God, one of whom is a Son of God by nature and one of whom is a Son of God by adoption. I thus conclude that none of Aquinas's objections applies to this theory once it is properly informed by a relativized conception of identity.
What about the conciliar statements which are evidently directed against this position? As someone who means to keep the Catholic faith whole and entire, I am ready to disavow any account of this mystery which runs afoul of such statements. But since these passages are directed against the Nestorian heresy, and by extension, against any account which carries the same implications as this heresy, it is not obvious that these passages apply to a proper understanding of the assumptus-homo theory, that is, one that preserves its implicit logic of relative identity. The whole point of these condemnations is evidently to preserve our understanding of Christ's personal unity. If the logic of relative identity is sufficient to preserve our understanding of God's absolute unity in the mystery of the Holy Trinity, then surely it is also sufficient to preserve our understanding of Christ's personal unity in the mystery of the Incarnation, especially since the latter instance of unity is not absolute, since Christ is presently endowed with distinct natures and properties. That is, although there are three divine persons existing in God, we can affirm that God is an undivided unity because we can say that each of these persons is ontically identical with God. Along the same lines, although we affirm that Christ assumed our nature by assuming a human being, and hence that he currently exists in relation to two beings (one divine and one human), we can nonetheless insist that there is one person of Christ, because we maintain that each of these beings is personally identical with Christ. 73 Since none of Aquinas's substantive objections to the assumptus-homo theory applies to an account of this theory that is properly informed by its implicit logic of relative identity, his case against this theory is not successful. His subsistence theory remains a tenable understanding of this mystery; however, I would like briefly to suggest two reasons for preferring the alternative account. In the first place, while nothing prevents one from restricting relative identity to the mystery of the Trinity, applying it to both mysteries in the way we have done here is surprisingly fruitful. On this unified approach, each mystery involves two instances of relative counting, namely, one for counting persons and another for counting beings. In addition, these mysteries involve distinct but complementary instances of unity-in-diversity: the mystery of the Holy Trinity presents us with a plurality of persons who are the same being, while the mystery of the Incarnation presents us with a plurality of beings which are the same person. While this sort of fruitfulness and explanatory power is certainly not a conclusive 73 My present goal is to show that the assumptus-homo theory is not committed to the Nestorian heresy. Although I am not interesting in rescuing Nestorianism from the charge of heresy, it is conceivable that relative identity would have helped Nestorius himself to establish (as he argued in The Bazaar of Heraclides) that his affirmation of a second ousios in Christ does not commit him to a second person in Christ.
reason for embracing the assumptus-homo theory, it is nonetheless far from trivial.
This theory enjoys a second advantage which I take to be far more compelling. The assumptus-homo theory is in a signifycantly better position than the subsistence theory to respond to the obvious logical objections that are made against the mystery of the Incarnation. Given our understanding of what it means to be God, and also what it means to be human, it is hard to see how the Son of God could have both sets of properties at the same time. This would mean, among other things, that he is both temporal and eternal, created and un-created, corporeal and incorporeal. It is thus easy to see why one might take such a doctrine to be completely incredible. It is one thing to accept a doctrine as a mystery of faith even though we cannot see how it is true, and quite another to accept one that we can see to be false. It is no stretch to insist that we can see it-thus construed-as false, as surely as we can see that there could not be an animal that is both a squid and a squirrel.
The Church Fathers were keenly aware of the deeply paradoxical nature of this mystery. To cite just one example, consider the following passage from the Tome of St. Leo:
And so, the Son of God, descending from His heavenly throne, yet not leaving the glory of the Father, enters into this lowly world. [He comes] in a new order, generated by a new birth. In a new order, because, invisible in his nature, He became visible in ours; surpassing comprehension, He has wished to be comprehended; remaining prior to time, he began to exist in time. The Lord of all things hid His immeasurable majesty to take on the form of a servant. The impassible God has not disdained to be a man subject to suffering nor the immortal to submit to the law of death.
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In this passage Leo attributes at least six pairs of seemingly incompatible properties to the incarnate Christ: (i) absent from and present with the Father, (ii) visible and invisible, (iii) comprehensible and incomprehensible, (iv) temporal and eternal, (v) vulnerable to harm and impassible, and (vi) mortal and immortal. How is it that the bishops at Chalcedon embraced this 74 ND 612/DS 294. confession by shouting, in one voice, that "Peter has spoken through the mouth of Leo"? Why did they not respond instead with dismay and disbelief? There is at least one key ingredient here that militates against such a response: these competing pairs of properties are attributed to Christ in connection with distinct natures. Although it would be absurd to say, for example, that Christ is both visible and invisible in the same sense at the same time, it is not obviously absurd to say that he is invisible with regard to his divine nature and visible with regard to our nature.
In defense of this strategy, Aquinas thus observes that it is impossible for contraries to be predicated of the same [subject] in the same respects, but nothing prevents their being predicated of the same [subject] in different aspects. And thus contraries are predicated of Christ, not in the same, but in different natures.
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As a final and complete defense against the above objection, this application of the reduplicative strategy is not terribly compelling. The objector is surely aware that these properties are said of Christ with regard to distinct natures, and hence, for example, that he is not being said to be both created and uncreated in the same sense at the same time. Even so, on the subsistence theory we are still being told that one suppositum is both created (secundum humanitatem) and uncreated (secundum divinitatem). And so the objector is bound to ask: how is it possible for one and the same being to be created in one sense and uncreated in any sense? Although a proponent of this account will surely continue to affirm the truth of this proposition (and hence its possibility), I cannot see that any progress has been made towards justifying this claim. Moreover, insisting that this is possible because Christ is both human and divine only raises the further question of how it is possible for one substance to have both of these natures at the same time.
On the assumptus-homo theory, we are not forced to say that one and the same being is both created in one sense and uncreated in another. According to this theory we are presented with two distinct beings: the divine being, which has the full array of divine properties, and the human being, which likewise has the full array of essential human properties. Since Christ is personally identical with both of these beings, we can affirm that he has both sets of properties, and hence that he is both created and uncreated, temporal and eternal, corporeal and incorporeal, and so on. That is, we can say that he is created secundum humanitatem because he is personally identical with a created human being, and that he is uncreated secundum divinitatem because he is personally identical with the divine essence, which is itself eternal and uncreated. Although we do not understand how it is possible for Christ to be personally identical with a plurality of beings (much less with beings that exist at such different orders of reality), within a logic of relative identity we can at least show that this supposition is not self-contradictory. Here I am thinking of Peter van Inwagen's parallel applications of relative identity to the mysteries of the Incarnation and the Trinity, and of his subsequent demonstration of their formal consistency.
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I conclude that the assumptus-homo theory, with its implicit logic of relative identity, provides us with a comparatively simple, intuitive, theologically fruitful, and orthodox way of understanding the mystery of the Incarnation, as well as a more credible and complete means of defending this mystery from the charge of logical impossibility. If this account of the Incarnation proves to be genuinely compatible with established Church doctrine concerning the one person and two natures of Christ, 76 After translating the fundamental tenets of both doctrines into the logic of relative identity, van Inwagen demonstrates the formal consistency of these statements by constructing (in each case) a model that consists of statements which share the same form as these statements and which are all true (on this model). For his application of this method to the mystery of the Trinity, see "And Yet They are Not Three Gods," 249ff. For his application of this method to the mystery of the Incarnation, see "Not by Confusion of Substance," 223-25.
